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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OVERVIEW
The term of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals covered by
this survey saw surprisingly little new ground broken in the field
of constitutional law; few cases of import reached the court for
consideration. This overview will highlight some of the more in-
teresting cases involving questions of constitutional law handed
down by the Tenth Circuit.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT
A. School Dress Codes: Hatch v. Goerke, 502 F.2d 1189 (10th
Cir. 1974)
Plaintiff parents brought a civil rights action under section
19831 to reverse a lower court holding that their son was rightfully
expelled from school for refusing to cut his hair in conformance
with the school's rules for student appearance. The mother of the
expelled child was an American Indian.
Rather than asserting the traditional free speech objection to
the expulsion of their child, the parents claimed that requiring
their son to cut his braided hair "violated their parental rights to
raise their children according to their own religious, cultural and
moral values in violation of the First, Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments." 2 In addition, the parents claimed that the expul-
sion without a hearing denied their son due process under the
fourteenth amendment.'
Although in the instant case parental, not student, rights
were in issue, the court applied its reasoning from Freeman v.
Flake,4 holding that "the duty and responsibility of supervising
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). The court stated the action was brought under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981-83, 2000d (1970). See 502 F.2d at 1190.
502 F.2d at 1191.
Two other claims unrelated to the appearance code were advanced by the plaintiffs:
(1) The compulsory attendance rules were vague and overbroad, and (2) permitting reli-
gious services to be conducted on school premises contravened the establishment and free
exercise clauses of the first amendment. Id. at 1193. While the court rejected the argument
of overbreadth, it held that the issue concerning religious services could not be dismissed,
as that issue raised a substantial question regarding the constitutional rights which plain-
tiffs were entitled to assert. Id. at 1194.
- 448 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1971).
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the length of a student's hair . . . is one for the states" and
should be handled through state procedures.5
The plaintiffs based their constitutional claim on the case of
Wisconsin v. Yoder.' The Tenth Circuit, however, distinguished
that case as having involved a state law which "contravenes the
basic religious tenets and practice of the Amish faith, both as to
the parent and the child."7 The issue of hair length in the present
case, said the court, did not reach the same level of significance.
Recognizing, however, that due process entitles one to at
least the "rudimentary elements of a hearing" before one can be
expelled,' the court found that the claim by the plaintiffs that
their son was denied due process could not, on its face, be dis-
missed. Denial of a hearing, stated the court, would deny the
child "the opportunity to appear and argue, at least, for leniency
or special consideration [which] could be of substantial value."9
B. Right to Picket: Garcia v. Gray, 507 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1974)
Following inaction in the resolution of a dispute between
minority city employees and the mayor and members of the city
council, 0 the appellant employees decided to picket the resi-
dences of those city officials. In response to the residential picket-
ing that ensued," the city council passed an ordinance which
prohibited picketing the residence of any individual, on the
grounds that people should be free to enjoy, in the privacy of their
homes, a "feeling of well-being, tranquility, and privacy," and on
the further grounds that picketing in residential neighborhoods
constitutes a nuisance.
2
5 502 F.2d at 1192 (citation omitted).
- 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In Yoder an Amish family refused to send their children to high
school as required by the state. They contended that to do so was contrary to the Amish
beliefs, and that sending their children to high school would hold them up to censure by
the Amish community and endanger the salvation of themselves and their children. Id.
at 209.
Id. at 218.
502 F.2d at 1194.
* Id. at 1195.
10 The employees were protesting a refusal of the city council to recognize a particular
union as their bargaining agent and were also protesting against alleged racial discrimina-
tion in employment practices by the city. Garcia v. Gray, 507 F.2d 539, 541 (10th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 1967 (1975).
1 Evidence indicated that at one point 300 protesters picketed the mayor's home,
chanting slogans and upsetting his family. 507 F.2d at 541.
"1 Id. at 542.
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The appellants contended that this ordinance violated their
right to free speech in that: (1) Its enactment was not unrelated
to the suppression of free speech; (2) its absolute ban on residen-
tial picketing violated the first and fourteenth amendments be-
cause it did not further an important governmental interest; and
(3) it was overbroad in that less restrictive alternatives existed to
accomplish the same goals.'3
In upholding the district court's verdict against the appellant
employees, the Tenth Circuit applied a balancing test, balancing
the relationship between the picketing and the area-the residen-
tial neighborhoods-against the possible existence of "reasonably
effective alternative means of communications."' 4 Finding that
the conduct of picketing, as an exercise of free speech, is subject
to reasonable regulation and control under the police power and
that there existed alternative locations for staging protests, the
court held that the sanctity of the home deserved the protection
afforded it by the ordinance in question:
The balancing of competing rights generally has resulted in a deter-
mination that the privacy of the individual householder, even that
of a public official, is entitled to protection.'"
C. Obscenity: United States v. Harding, 507 F.2d 294 (10th Cir.
1974)
United States v. Harding'" involved a conviction for receiving
obscene matter transported in interstate commerce. Upon appeal
the Supreme Court remanded the case for consideration in light
of the Court's decision in Miller v. California. '7 The Tenth Circuit
then remanded to the trial court to consider the sole issue of
whether the materials were obscene under the standards set out
in Miller.
The principal issue at the trial court revolved around a stipu-
lation made by the defendant at his original trial that the materi-
als in question were obscene. On remand the defendant con-
tended that:





507 F.2d 294 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 1437 (1975).
" 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
1976
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2. Given the differences in the two tests, defendant would not have
stipulated to obscenity under the Miller case.
3. Failure to relieve defendant of his stipulation where the stan-
dards of obscenity have changed deprives him of his right to have
the jury decide the issue of obscenity. The trial court is not author-
ized to decide whether the material is obscene under Miller.IS
The trial court, after considering the arguments of defendants,
ruled that the materials were obscene under the Miller standards.
The Tenth Circuit, in affirming the district court's holding,
relied on the recent Supreme Court decision in Hamling v. United
States,9 wherein the issue was a pre-Miller obscenity conviction
which was reconsidered and upheld by the Ninth Circuit. 0 The
Tenth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court "did not require as
a constitutional matter" that courts substitute standards of a
smaller geographical area for uniform national standards. 1 Fur-
ther relying on Hamling, the court ruled that, by stipulating to
obscenity based on the "redeeming social value" test, the defen-
dant also stipulated to obscenity based on the less exacting
"without serious artistic or social merit" test enumerated in
Miller. 22
HI. EQUAL PROTECTION
Title VII: Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923 (10th
Cir. 1975)
At issue in Muller v. United States Steel Corp.23 was the
defendant's failure to promote the plaintiff, who was of Spanish
American origin, to a supervisory position. After serving 15 years
with defendant company without a promotion, plaintiff quit his
job and brought this suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
24
Alleging discrimination in the defendant's system of promotion,
plaintiff sought, inter alia, monetary damages for his alleged con-
structive discharge. Defendant Steel Corporation sought reversal
" 507 F.2d at 297.
418 U.S. 87 (1974).
The defendant in Hamling was convicted of using the mails to carry an obscene
book. The Supreme Court directed its attention to "what rules of law shall govern obscen-
ity convictions that occurred prior to . . . this Court's decision in Miller v. California
.... Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 98 (1973).
507 F.2d at 297, citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104 (1974).
" 507 F.2d at 297.
23 509 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1975).
21 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) (1970).
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of the trial court's finding of discrimination and of its award of
damages for plaintiff's constructive discharge.
While people of Spanish American origin were not, to any
significant degree, under-employed in defendant's plant, the
court found support for plaintiff's contention that defendant's
promotional practices were discriminatory.15 In addition, while
the court found that plaintiff was not lacking in credentials quali-
fying him for promotion, he was never, in his 15 years with the
defendant, selected by his superiors for the position of spell fore-
man 2'-a job considered to be a forerunner to possible promotion.
To rebut the allegations of defendant that evidence was in-
sufficient to establish discrimination against the plaintiff, the
court relied on two of its earlier decisions holding that no specific
intent to discriminate need be found: If the employer's conduct
results in discrimination, a violation of Title VII will occur." The
fact that discrimination did occur, coupled with evidence that
there were no "meaningful standards to guide the promotion deci-
sion,"2 8 led the court to conclude that the evidence of a Title VII
violation was sufficient to uphold the lower court's decision
against defendant.
Finally, the Tenth Circuit considered the lower court's ruling
that the plaintiff had been constructively discharged, and re-
viewed its decision to award monetary damages as a result of that
discharge. 9 On these points the Tenth Circuit reversed. The court
stated that a precondition to a constructive discharge is a con-
scious decision on the part of the employer to render the em-
ployee's job so intolerable as to force his resignation. ° The evi-
25 During 1968 and 1969, 20-25 persons were selected for the position of spell foreman;
all were of Anglo origin, and only 15 had more seniority than the plaintiff. 509 F.2d at
925.
28 Evidence showed that the plaintiff had had 5 years of previous welding experience,
had a high school degree, and had exercised community leadership. Id. at 925.
27 Id. at 927. See also Spurlock v. United Airlines, 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972); Jones
v. Lee Way Motor Freight, 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1970).
28 509 F.2d at 927-28. Defendant argued that everyone promoted was more qualified
than the plaintiff. The court answered by saying that "there is no basis for so concluding
where there is a palpable lack of objective standards." Id. at 929.
" The court also considered and rejected defendant's argument that a business ne-
cessity existed for its actions. Relying on Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971),
the Tenth Circuit ruled that to rebut a prima facie case by the business necessity rule,
the employer must show that "the maintenance of safety and efficiency requires the
practice which obtains." 507 F.2d at 928.
11 507 F.2d at 929.
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dence failed to support this precondition; the finding of construc-
tive discharge was reversed and the monetary award against the
defendant was vacated.
III. DUE PROCESS
A. State Action-Right to a Hearing: Teleco, Inc. v. Southwest-
ern Bell Telephone Co., 511 F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1975)
Southwestern Bell Telephone, which supplies telephone
service in Oklahoma under tariffs filed with the state, suspended
service to plaintiff corporation after its continued violations of the
"foreign attachment" tariffs.' Teleco received no hearing prior to
the suspension of its service, and alleged that it was denied its
right to due process under the fourteenth amendment. The Tenth
Circuit upheld the lower court's finding that no such violation
had occurred-that the action taken by Southwestern Bell was
not state action. 2
Teleco apparently maintained that because the state re-
quired Southwestern Bell to file its tariffs with the state regula-
tory agency, and because those tariffs automatically became
effective if no timely objection were raised, state action became
an issue in any attempt to terminate service. A hearing thus
would be required under the fouteenth amendment before termi-
nation of service could occur.
In reaching its decision the Tenth Circuit relied on the recent
Supreme Court case, Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 33 in
which the Court ruled that the termination of service by a power
company, which was likewise subject to extensive state regula-
tion, did not have a sufficient nexus with the state so as to render
the power company's termination of customer service state ac-
tion. 34 Finding that the state involvement in the present
case-requirements of state approval of company policy-was the
same as that in Jackson, the Tenth Circuit ruled that no state
action was involved and, therefore, no violation of due process
", The tariff in question required that any direct electrical connection be made by a
coupler installed by the telephone company. 511 F.2d at 950 n.1 (10th Cir. 1975).
12 Other grounds for reversal were also advanced by Teleco, but the most significant,
and, therefore, the only one considered here, is the due process claim. See id. at 951.
419 U.S. 345 (1974).




had occurred by denying plaintiff a hearing prior to terminating
its service.
B. Juvenile Court Proceedings: Radcliff v. Anderson, 509 F.2d
1093 (10th Cir. 1974)
At issue in Radcliff v. Anderson35 was the retroactivity of the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Lamb v. Brown,- wherein the court
ruled that an Oklahoma statute31 which afforded juvenile court
proceedings to females under the age of 18, yet limited these same
benefits to males who were under the age of 16, was unconstitu-
tional as a denial of equal protection under the fourteenth amend-
ment. Yet in Lamb the court concluded its decision with the
statement: "This ruling shall not apply retroactively. ' ' 1
Petitioners in the present case were, at the age of 17,
prosecuted as adults for various crimes they had committed.
They contended in their habeas petitions that they should have
been afforded, retroactively, the benefits of the court's ruling in
Lamb, and alleged that the statement therein regarding its re-
troactivity was mere dictum, and not binding on their claims.
The Tenth Circuit agreed.
While conceding that the denial to the petitioners of juvenile
court proceedings did not in any way affect the accuracy of the
fact finding process, the court concluded that to deny plaintiffs
these proceedings raised questions of "basic fairness and essential
justice. ' 39 The court found support for its position in a Fourth
Circuit case which also involved the retroactivity of a holding
that the different treatment of juveniles amounted to a violation
u 509 F.2d-1093 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 1667 (1975). The Tenth
Circuit's opinion in Radcliff, decided in June of 1974, did not appear in the Federal
Reporter until almost a year later. The court's denial of a rehearing is found immediately
following the court's decision. 509 F.2d 1093 (10th Cir. 1974).
38 456 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1972).
", Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1101(a) (Supp. 1969). The statute has since been
amended and now reads: "The term 'child' means any person under the age of eighteen
(18) years." Id. (Supp. 1974).
3' 456 F.2d at 20.
, Some of the benefits available to those prosecuted under the juvenile proceedings
which are not available to idults, are:
[T]he form of petition, custody, release to parents, temporary detention,
conduct of hearings, including a provision for privacy, and discretionary
certification for adult proceedings after a preliminary hearing.
509 F.2d at 1095 (citations omitted).
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of the fourteenth amendment.4" In that decision the Fourth Cir-
cuit stated that to deny to those in one municipality the same
proceedings available to those in all other areas of the state
''seems to us so fundamentally unfair as to impeach the validity
of the adult proceedings."4
As no question of retroactivity was raised in Lamb and be-
cause the court considered "basic fairness" and "essential jus-
tice" to be in issue, the Tenth Circuit ruled that, despite the
dictum in the case to the contrary, Lamb be given retroactive
effect.
IV. NINTH AMENDMENT
Deportation: Cervantes v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, 510 F.2d 89 (10th Cir. 1975)
Petitioners Ramon and Ocana Cervantes, husband and wife,
faced deportation for being illegally in the United States.42 Peti-
tioners had married subsequent to their arrival in the United
States and, while in this country, Ocana gave birth to petitioner
Joe Alfred.
Petitioners relied on a novel argument in an effort to avoid
deportation. They claimed that "the deportation order contrav-
enes Joe Alfred's rights under the Ninth Amendment to the
United States Constitution." 43 Relying on Griswold v.
Connecticut44 and Roe v. Wade,45 petitioners asserted that under
the ninth amendment their son, a United States citizen, had a
right to the continued love and affection of his parents in the
country of his birth. 6
* Woodall v. Pettibone, 465 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 922 (1973).
Yet Judge Seth, in a strong dissent in Radcliff, attacked the court's "complete reliance
on the rationale of Woodall v. Pettibone." 509 F.2d at 1097 (Seth, J., dissenting).
Woodall v. Pettibone, 465 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1972).
42 Ramon had remained in the United States past the 6-month period he was author-
ized to stay. His wife had never presented herself for inspection upon entering the country,
510 F.2d at 89.
'3 Id. at 90. The ninth amendment states:
The enumeration in the constitution of certain rights shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
" 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
, In Griswold, Justice Goldberg argued that
[t]he language and the history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the
Framers of the Constitution believed that there are additional fundamental
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The court rejected the petitioners' argument. In a previous
Tenth Circuit case4" the fifth amendment formed the basis of the
plaintiff's claim that "the deportation would be unconstitutional
because a family would be divided and the children would be
deprived of their constitutional right to the family unit's contin-
uation. 48 The court there found that the incidental impact the
immigration laws had on the family unit was not so significant
as to raise constitutional problems.9
Ruling on petitioners' ninth amendment claim in the present
case, the court stated that the deportations threatened only an
"incidental impact" on the child, and concluded that:
We cannot agree with petitioners that the Ninth Amendment as
interpreted in a concurring opinion in Griswold and in Roe compels
a different result than we reached [after a consideration of the fifth
amendment claim] in Robles.1
Robert W. Drake
SCHOOL SEGREGATION NORTHERN STYLE IN DENVER,
COLORADO
Keyes v. School District No. 1, 521 F.2d 465 (10th
Cir. 1975)
INTRODUCTION
In Keyes v. School District No. 1,1 plaintiffs alleged public
rights, protected from governmental infringement, which exist along side
those fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight constitu-
tional amendments.
381 U.S. 479, 488 (1965) (concurring opinion).
,7 Robles v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 485 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1973).
' 510 F.2d at 89.
485 F.2d at 102.
c' 510 F.2d at 91-92.
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 303 F. Supp. 279 (D. Colo. 1969) (granting plaintiffs a
preliminary injunction), 313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo. 1970) (memorandum opinion following
trial on the merits), 313 F. Supp. 90 (D. Colo. 1970) (remedial desegregation order), afi'd
in part and rev'd in part, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
413 U.S. 189 (1973), on remand, 368 F. Supp. 207 (D. Colo. 1973), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3399 (Jan. 13, 1976) (No.
75-701).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
schools in Denver, Colorado were segregated.2 Upon a finding of
de jure segregation in only one part of the school district, Park
Hill,3 the district court ordered district-wide desegregation.4 The
district court found the School Board had engaged in intention-
ally segregative acts in Park Hill but was unable to find the Board
had engaged in similar acts toward core city schools even though
these schools had high concentrations of black and Chicano stu-
dents. In ordering a remedy covering both Park Hill and the core
city schools, the district court consciously adopted a Plessy v.
Ferguson5 line of reasoning.
[S]eparate educational facilities (of the de facto variety) may be
maintained, but a fundamental and absolute requisite is that these
shall be equal. Once it is found that these separate facilities are
unequal in the quality of education provided, there arises a substan-
tial probability that a constitutional violation exists. This probabil-
ity becomes almost conclusive where minority groups are relegated
to inferior schools.'
Appeal was taken from the district court's finding and order to
the Tenth Circuit7 and was ultimately reviewed by the Supreme
Court.8 The Supreme Court focused on the district court's finding
of de jure segregation in only one geographic area within the
school district.
[A] finding of intentionally segregative school board action in a
meaningful portion of a school system, as in this case, creates a
presumption . . . . It establishes a prima facie case of unlawful
segregative design on the part of school authorities, and shifts to
those authorities the burden of proving that other segregated schools
within the system are not also the result of intentionally segregative
actions.'
2 At the outset of this litigation in 1969 plaintiffs were granted a preliminary injunc-
tion against the defendant School Board. The newly elected Board was enjoined from
implementing a resolution which would have rescinded resolutions passed by the previous
Board which were designed to mitigate or reduce segregation. 303 F. Supp. 279 (D. Colo.
1969).
313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo. 1970).
313 F. Supp. 90 (D. Colo. 1970).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
313 F. Supp. at 83.
The Tenth Circuit reversed that part of the remedy ordering desegregation of core
city schools as to which no finding of de jure segregation had been made. 445 F.2d 990
(10th Cir. 1971).
413 U.S. 189 (1973). See also Comment, Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1: Unlocking the
Northern Schoolhouse Doors, 9 HARv. Civ. L.-Crv. RIGHTS L. REV. 124 (1974).
1 413 U.S. at 208. The Court refused to hold, as many civil rights advocates had hoped
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On remand the burden would be on the School Board to show that
its segregative acts in Park Hill "did not cause or contribute to
the current segregated condition of the core city schools."'" An
"allegedly logical, racially neutral explanation"" would not be
sufficient to rebut the presumption of system-wide segregative
design raised by proof of intentionally segregative action in one
part of the district.
The district court was ordered, on remand, first, to allow the
School Board to prove that Park Hill was isolated from the rest
of the district, so that actions by the School Board there would
not affect the rest of the district; second, if the School Board
failed to prove such isolation, the district court was ordered to
determine whether the Board's acts as to Park Hill made the
entire district a dual school system; and third, even if the district
court did not find such acts caused Denver to have a dual school
system, the School Board would still have the difficult task of
rebutting the presumption that the Board's intentional segrega-
tive acts in Park Hill did not create or contribute to the segrega-
tion in core city schools. 3
On remand the district court held the School Board had
failed to show Park Hill was an isolated area. Further, the district
court found the defendant School Board's acts made the entire
district a dual, de jure segregated school system. 4
it would, that de facto segregation amounts to a constitutional violation. To have held de
facto segregation was a constitutional violation would probably have resulted in a deluge
of school segregation suits from areas outside the southern states where, at the time of
Brown 1, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), school segregation had been mandated by state statute or
constitution. In Keyes, Justice Powell, with whom Justice Douglas agreed, criticized the
Court for adhering to the de facto-de jure distinction. He urged the Court to take a uniform
approach to school segregation unburdened by outmoded distinctions. Id. at 217-53 (Pow-
ell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the
Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564 (1965); Goodman, De
Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CAL. L. REV. 275
(1972).
0 413 U.S. at 211.
Id. at 210.
" This is merely an application of the well-settled evidentiary principle that
"the prior doing of other similar acts, whether clearly a part of the scheme
or not, is useful as reducing the possiblity that the act in question was done
with innocent intent." 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 200 (3d ed. 1940) .... Simi-
larly, a finding of illicit intent as to a meaningful portion of the item under
consideration has substantial probative value on the question of illicit intent
as to the remainder.
Id. at 207-08.
Id. at 213-15.
" 368 F. Supp. 207 (D. Colo. 1973). Because the district court found Denver had a
1976
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I. TENTH CIRCUIT-THE SECOND TIME AROUND
Three issues were reviewed by the Tenth Circuit: First,
whether the trial court had properly determined the entire dis-
trict was a dual school system; second, whether the student
reassignment and transportation plan was proper; and third,
whether the order requiring bilingual-bicultural education, fac-
ulty, and staff desegregation, and the combination of two high
schools was justified. 5
The School Board conceded that Park Hill was not isolated
geographically or otherwise from the rest of the district. Instead,
the Board offered evidence to show the absence of causal effect
between its proven segregative acts and current levels of segrega-
tion. The Tenth Circuit remonstrated the trial court's handling
of this evidence:
Although the trial court admitted and considered the Board's evi-
dence, it was of the view that proof of extraterritorial effect was
somewhat beside the point; the court viewed the principal issue on
remand as whether the Board's segregative intent with respect to the
entire district could be inferred from its Park Hill actions."6
The Board had offered the testimony of a statistician to show the
absence of extraterritorial effect from the Board's Park Hill acts
upon core city schools. 7 The trial court found this evidence was
"merely conclusory and lacking in substance.' 8 Reluctantly, the
Tenth Circuit affirmed, commenting that the trial court had mis-
understood the issues to be considered on remand. Nevertheless,
since a correct reading of the Supreme Court's decision would
have supported the trial court's ruling, that ruling could not be
reversed as it was not "clearly erroneous."1 9
dual school system, it was not necessary for the trial court to consider the third issue set
out by the Supreme Court-rebuttal of the presumption of system-wide effect from proof
of past intentionally segregative acts in a meaningful part of the system. Id. at 209.
521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975).
' Id. at 471.
" The statistician had studied percentage variations in the racial composition of the
student bodies in Denver schools between 1962 and 1968. He had also studied the racial
composition of schoolage children in Denver on a neighborhood basis between 1960 and
1970. From these studies he concluded that the Board's acts in Park Hill had no impact
on the racial composition of core city schools. Plaintiffs contested his testimony with three
experts of their own. Id. at 472.
18 521 F.2d at 472, quoting 368 F. Supp. at 210.
" Id. at 472. The court of appeals added, "An appellate court will affirm the rulings
of the lower court on any ground that finds support in the record, even where the lower
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Appeal was also taken by the School Board from the district
court's decision to exclude the testimony of the superintendent of
Denver schools."0 The trial court rejected this testimony because
it bore on conditions in Denver schools as of the time of remand
rather than as of the time of the original hearing in 1969.
Testimony by the superintendent sought to disprove the ex-
istence of a dual school system in Denver by the absence of the
usual, classic indicators attending statutorily enforced segrega-
tion." The superintendent's testimony was based on a misappre-
hension of the Supreme Court's prior decision in this same litiga-
tion. There, the Court held de jure segregation could as well result
from the intentional acts of the School Board as it could from a
statutory scheme." The superintendent's suggestion that the trial
court search for the classic indicators of statutorily enforced seg-
regation would obviously be fruitless where there was no such
statutory scheme. The superintendent's testimony had the aura
of a "straw man" argument. In upholding the trial court's ruling,
the court of appeals said:
[C]ourts must presume the existence of a dual school system from
school authorities' segregative acts, the burden then shifting to those
authorities to prove the absence of any causal relation between those
acts and current levels of racial segregation.Y
court reached its conclusions from a different or even erroneous course of reasoning." Id.
at 472-73.
The Tenth Circuit also affirmed the trial court's exclusion of evidence offered to show
that certain segregative acts occurring in 1964 had had no effect on school segregation
either inside or outside of Park Hill. The trial court had rejected this evidence on the
ground of remoteness. Id. at 473.
" The school superintendent offered to testify that, as of the time of remand, Denver
did not have a dual school system in the classic sense. Among the classic indicators are:
State enforced separation of the races; exclusion of students from certain schools on the
basis of race; designation of schools along racial lines by reference to faculty composition;
and differences in transportation services and extracurricular activities. These indicators,
however, arose in the context of segregation authorized or mandated by state statute or
constitution. Denver's segregation, and for that matter most northern school segregation,
is the result of more subtle, behind-the-scene manipulations of the School Board, an
agency of the state. Id. at 474.
" See note 20 supra.
"' We hold that the differentiating factor between de jure segregation
and so-called de facto segregation to which we referred in Swann is purpose
or intent to segregate.
413 U.S. at 208 (footnote omitted).
' 521 F.2d at 474 (footnote omitted). Although the superintendent's testimony was
not offered for such purpose, the Tenth Circuit suggested it would have been admissible
as probative of the proper remedy in this case. Id. at 475.
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The critical finding by the district court that Denver had a
dual school system was affirmed. Given the existence of a dual,
de jure segregated school system, did the trial court afford the
proper remedy? After considering and rejecting remedial plans
submitted by both the School Board and plaintiffs, 4 the trial
court proceeded under its equitable powers to fashion a remedy
of its own. 5
Under the district court's order, elementary schools were to
be desegregated in three ways: 24 schools would be rezoned; 23
schools would be rezoned and would receive students from satel-
lite attendance areas; and 37 schools were paired for the purpose
of reassigning students on a part-time basis only. Students in
schools of the last category would spend one-half of their time at
a segregated neighborhood school and the other half of their time
at an integrated receiving school.2" This plan was unacceptable to
the court of appeals as "part-time desegregation." 7 The rule that
the scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent
of the constitutional violation28 requires, and the Tenth Circuit so
held, that full-time segregation be remedied by full-time deseg-
regation. 9 This part of the district court's remedy was, there-
fore, reversed by the Tenth Circuit.
District-wide Anglo-minority enrollment ratios were utilized
by the trial court as guidelines in shaping the remedy. The School
Board appealed the use of this device, arguing that since its
1, Summaries of these two plans follow the opinion of Judge Lewis as Appendices A
and B. 521 F.2d at 485-87.
I5 E.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1970); Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
' 521 F.2d at 475.
The [trial] court's principal justification for part-time pairing was the desir-
ability of anchoring students and parents to a neighborhood school, which
would continue to serve as the focus for student extracurricular activities and
community functions.
Id.
27 The court of appeals described the district court's order as "part-time desegrega-
tion." Relying, principally, upon two Fifth Circuit decisions, Arvizu v. Waco Indep.
School Dist., 495 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1974), and United States v. Texas, 467 F.2d 848 (5th
Cir. 1972), holding part-time desegregation an unacceptable substitute for dismantling a
dual school system, the Tenth Circuit was unwilling to accept a partial remedy.
11 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1970).
29 521 F.2d at 478-79. The district court's remedy would have left 13 of the 18 predomi-
nantly minority elementary schools desegregated only on a part-time basis. Id.
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proven intentionally segregative acts had occurred in only one
part of the school district, the remedy should be similarly re-
stricted. This suggestion would have forced plaintiffs to prove
segregation in every school in the district before a district-wide
remedy could be imposed. Such a suggestion flies directly in the
face of the Supreme Court's direction to the district court on
remand:
If the District Court determines that the Denver school system is a
dual school system, respondent School Board has the affirmative
duty to desegregate the entire system "root and branch.""3
In upholding the district court's use of district-wide enrollment
data, the court of appeals declined the School Board's invitation
to adopt different remedial standards for de jure segregation
caused by School Board acts rather than statutory scheme.' A
finding that the School Board's acts constituted the entire system
a dual system, as the trial court found was the case in Denver,
required the district court to order a plan to desegregate the entire
system "root and branch."3
The court of appeals balked at approving that part of the
order leaving five schools with minority enrollment between 78
percent and 88 percent. This was justified by the trial court on
the ground of inaccessability of the schools and to facilitate
bilingual -bicultural education. 3 In reversing, the court of appeals
held the bilingual-bicultural education component of the remedy
was unwarranted. No finding had been made that the curricula
or teaching methods offered in Denver schools discriminated
against minority students. 4 Since the scope of the remedy is de-
termined by the nature and extent of the violation, '- the district
30 413 U.S. at 213, quoted in 521 F.2d at 476.
31 521 F.2d at 476-77. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, appealed the transportation
aspect of the court's remedy because it imposed greater burdens on minority than non-
minority students. The court of appeals felt the district court's remedy was not an abuse
of discretion since the plan offered by plaintiffs, while allocating transportation burdens
more evenly among minority and non-minority students, would have required more overall
transportation. Minority students comprised 42 percent of the system's enrollment but
comprised 60 percent of all students bused under the court's order. No error was found in
the "balance" thus struck by the trial court. Id. at 479 n.13.
32 See note 30 supra. Judge Seth, concurring specially, felt it was error for the trial
court to adopt the use of district-wide enrollment ratios as guidelines. 521 F.2d at 488-89.
Id. at 479-80.
I, ld. at 481-82.
3 See note 28 supra.
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court's failure to find curricula discrimination precluded it from
ordering curricular remedies."
Remand was ordered to the district court for a determination
of what, if any, other reasons would justify leaving these five
schools with predominantly minority compositions. Unless it is
shown on remand that desegregation of these schools would be
impractical or unwise, or segregation in these schools was not the
result of past School Board discrimination, then the district
court's duty to eliminate segregation "root and branch" requires
the court to order these schools be desegregated.3 7
CONCLUSION
The Keyes case was before the Tenth Circuit for the second,
but maybe not the last time.3 While the larger, more abstract
questions of the case have been settled, 39 the practical and often
harder problems associated with actual desegregation remain
ahead. Over these issues the litigation continues."
Nancy A. Hopf
In so holding, the Tenth Circuit distinguished the case before it from the situation
in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), and a previous Tenth Circuit decision based on
Lau, Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974). In both of those
cases, curricula remedies were warranted because plaintiffs specifically proved curriculum
discrimination against non-English speaking students. Both of those cases, moreover, were
decided on statutory rather than constitutional bases. 521 F.2d at 483. Lau and Serna were
decided under section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970). See
Tenth Circuit Survey, 52 DENVER L.J. 90 (1975).
In a belabored effort to discredit the bilingual -bicultural education component of the
district court's remedial order, the court of appeals went on to hold that the Constitution
does not require states to adopt educational plans "tailored to [minorities'] unique cul-
tural and developmental needs." 521 F.2d at 482. And by way of dictum, the court of
appeals said that such programs, even when justified, are "not a substitute for desegrega-
tion." Id. at 480. This statement appears to be overkill in the court of appeals' effort to
discredit the trial court's use of a bilingual-bicultural component in the remedy. School
pairing, rezoning of school boundary lines, student transportation, minority faculty re-
cruitment and reassignment, and bilingual-bicultural education are all desegregation
tools. Which of these tools a district court must use depends in each case upon the nature
and extent of the violation proved. See note 28 supra.
11 521 F.2d at 480. Ironically, the court of appeals vacated that part of the trial court's
order consolidating two high school campuses to achieve an overall Anglo enrollment of
55 percent. The Tenth Circuit found no support for this order in the record. Id. at 483-84.
That part of the court's order on faculty and staff desegregation was affirmed. Id. at 484-
85.
3' "All parties appeal with typical inflexibility of position . Id. at 468.
s' See notes and text accompanying notes 8-13 supra.
521 F.2d 465 (remanding issues to the trial court), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3399
(Jan. 13, 1976) (No. 75-701).
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TEACHERS' SPEECH AND FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Bertot v. School District No. 1, 522 F.2d 1171 (10th
Cir. 1975)
INTRODUCTION
Mrs. Donna Bertot and Mrs. Martha Sweeny, teachers at
Laramie High School, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983' in the
United States District Court for the District of Wyoming after the
Albany School District Board of Trustees (the District) voted not
to renew their contracts.2 The plaintiffs claimed that the Dis-
trict's action was in retaliation for their exercise of first amend-
ment rights and that the procedures used by the board members
in making the decision denied them the right to procedural due
process. Plaintiffs sued the District and its board members, the
superintendent of schools, and the school principal, in their indi-
vidual and official capacities, asking for declaratory and
injunctive relief and damages.
The case was submitted to the jury on a charge covering the
first amendment claims and the defendants' assertions of im-
munity. The trial court refused to submit any factual claim on
the due process question, because, under Wyoming law, plain-
tiffs' contracts could be terminated without a hearing.3 The jury
answered two special interrogatories against the plaintiffs and
returned a general verdict for the defendants.'
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) [hereinafter cited as section 1983] provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, 522 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1975).
Wyoming law classifies teachers as either initial contract teachers or continuing
contract teachers. An initial contract teacher is one who has not achieved continuing
contract status. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 21.1-152(d) (Supp. 1975). Continuing contract teachers
are those who have been employed by the same school district for 3 consecutive years and
have had their contracts renewed for a fourth, or those teachers who have achieved con-
tinuing contract status in one district, have taught for 2 consecutive years without lapse
of time, and have had their contract renewed for a third in another school district. Id. §
21.1-152(b). Continuing contract teachers are employed on a continuing basis and are
entitled to a hearing before the board within 30 days after receiving a notice of termina-
tion. Id. §§ 21.1-154, 21.1-158. The Wyoming statutes do not provide for a hearing when
an initial contract teacher is not rehired.
I The special interrogatories were: (1) Whether the defendants acted in good faith in
1976
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the deci-
sion of the trial court regarding the due process issue and
Sweeny's first amendment claim. The court found, however,- that
Bertot was entitled to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on
her first amendment claim. The court directed that Bertot be
granted declaratory and injunctive relief, but found that the de-
fendants were immune from damages in their individual capaci-
ties.' On remand, the district court was directed to determine the
liabilities of the District and the individual defendants in their
official capacities.6
I. ISSUES AND FACTS
In Bertot the Tenth Circuit was faced with three separate
issues. The first was whether initial-contract (or nontenured)
teachers are entitled to the protections of procedural due process
when they are not rehired.7 The second concerned the type of
failing to renew the plaintiffs' teaching contracts, and (2) whether the defendants acted
maliciously and for the purpose of retaliation in failing to renew the contracts. 522 F.2d
at 1175. (Lower court action not reported.)
Id. at 1177, 1184, 1185.
Id. at 1185.
In Bertot neither plaintiff received a hearing prior to the nonrenewal of her contract.
It is settled law that one has no interest in reemployment protected by procedural due
process, unless one can demonstrate that nonrenewal would deprive him of liberty or that
he has a property interest in continued employment. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972). Property interests are created and their dimensions defined by existing rules
or understandings that stem from sources independent of the Constitution, such as state
law or particular agreements. Id. at 577. One can acquire "de facto tenure" if there
are implied agreements to the effect that once a teacher has met certain criteria he can
count on continued employment. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). In
Sindermann the Court upheld plaintiff's claim to "de facto tenure" on the ground of an
understanding fostered by the college administration. Citing Roth the Court stated that
"a person's interest is a property interest for due process purposes if there are such rules
or mutually explicit understandings to support his claim of entitlement to the benefit."
Id. at 601. For a discussion of Roth and Sindermann, see Shulman, Employment of
Nontenured Faculty: Some Implications of Roth and Sindermann, 51 DENVER L.J. 215
(1974).
The Tenth Circuit found that neither Sweeny nor Bertot had statutory or contractual
tenure. 522 F.2d at 1176. Appellants were initial contract teachers. See note 2 supra. With
respect to initial contract teachers, the Wyoming Supreme Court has stated it is aware of
no statutory or contractual right to reemployment. O'Melia v. Sweetwater County School
Dist., 497 P.2d 540, 542 (Wyo. 1972). Nor did either Sweeny or Bertot present sufficient
evidence to put in issue the question of whether they had an implied property right to
continued employment. 522 F.2d at 1177. The court applied the rule that
when the evidence is such that without weighing the credibility of the wit-
nesses there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict, the court
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evidence necessary to show that a teacher's contract was not re-
newed because her employers objected to certain of her activities
protected by the first amendment.8 The third and most complex
issue involved the question of who could be held liable for dam-
ages when the nonrenewal of a teacher's contract was found un-
constitutional. This comment will discuss the court's treatment
of the issues decided and analyze the questions remanded.
Sweeny had appeared on a local radio program where she
took a position contrary to that of the board members concerning
the school dress code. Sweeny argued that this was a reason for
her not being rehired The court, however, pointed to the fact
that every member of the board testified that Sweeny's appear-
ance on the show had no bearing on their decision,' 0 and that the
criticism of her work included things unrelated to the radio pro-
gram." The court concluded that, with respect to Sweeny, the
jury's findings were supported by the record.
should determine the proceeding by non-suit, a directed verdict or otherwise
in accordance with the applicable practice without submission to the jury,
or by judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Id. at 1176, citing Brady v. Southern Ry., 320 U.S. 476, 479-80 (1943). The court found
that evidence to support appellants' claim of "de facto tenure" was "wholly lacking." Id.
at 1177.
It is fundamental that teachers, even though nontenured, cannot be fired or fail to
have their contracts renewed for exercising constitutional rights. Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 596-98 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Adams v.
Campbell County School Dist., 511 F.2d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 1975); Rampey v. Allen,
501 F.2d 1090 (10th Cir. 1974). See Tenth Circuit Survey, 52 DENVER L.J. 85 (1975).
, The incident apparently upset the principal, and he brought the matter up with the
District when they were discussing her contract. In the written criticism of her work that
he later prepared, the principal referred to this incident as an example of "lack of judg-
ment."
I" Every board member flatly stated that Mrs. Sweeny's radio appearance did not
influence their decision. 522 F.2d at 1179. It has been said:
When a violation of First Amendment Rights is alleged, the reasons for
dismissal or nonrenewal of an employment contract must be examined to see
if the reasons given are only a cloak for activity or attitudes protected by the
Constitution.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 582 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). The Tenth
Circuit, aware of the possibility of concealed motives on the part of the school board
members, stated that it was "important to consider the manner in which the board
reached its decision and the matters relied upon in the process, considering both the
recommendations to the [District] and any additional reasons for their action." 522 F.2d
at 1178.
" From the record, the "things" included lack of discipline in her classrooms, antago-
nism of students, utilization of class time for discussing material not related to the subject
of the class, and poor judgment. It would seem that the actions described are not constitu-
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As in the case of Sweeny, the principal prepared a written
criticism of Bertot's work after the District decided not to renew
her contract. 2 The principal criticized Bertot for: (1) Encourag-
ing the development of an "underground" student newspaper; (2)
not seeking his advice with respect to that newspaper; and (3)
after learning of his opposition to the newspaper, soliciting a non-
staff person to aid the students. The principal regarded Bertot's
actions and attitudes concerning the student paper as "insubordi-
nation." He also included under "lack of judgment" an incident
in which Bertot showed some students a film deemed not appro-
priate for sophomore classes. 3 He also cited her greeting of stu-
dents with a peace sign as an example of "immaturity."
When the concept of a student newspaper had come up in
Bertot's English class, she had told the students that, although
classtime could not be spent on it, she was willing to help them
after school hours. Dr. Ludwick learned of the proposed project
and voiced his disapproval. Bertot then withdrew from the pro-
ject, but the students continued alone and published one issue.
Shortly thereafter, the principal told Bertot that he thought she
should stop the students from publishing more issues.
The court found that, although some reference was made to
the film incident and peace signs, "it is an inescapable conclusion
from examining [the] record that Mrs. Bertot's actions con-
nected with the student newspaper were the paramount and re-
curring reason for non-renewal of her contract."' 4 The court also
concluded that first amendment protections extend to activities
in connection with the publication of a newspaper 5 and, there-
tionally protected on the theory of balancing the interest of the teacher in commenting
on matters of public concern with the interest of the state in promoting the efficiency of
its public services. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). Nor are they
protected under the material and substantial disruption test of Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
" The criticism is reproduced at 522 F.2d at 1180 n.3.
13 Later a disturbance was caused by a student who was given the film by Bertot for
his private viewing. The principal objected to the film about, black militancy because it
made the police look foolish. Record at 157, id. at 1171.
"1 Id. at 1182. In the case of Bertot, the testimony of the superintendent of schools,
who was also a member of the personnel committee, and the testimony of the board
members showed that they relied on the reasons presented by the principal in determining
not to renew her contract. Id.
11 Id. at 1183, citing Papish v. University of Mo. Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973);
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). See also Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d
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fore, the district court was in error when it refused to grant Ber-
tot's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
From the Tenth Circuit's treatment of Bertot and Sweeny,
some observations can be made. The method relied upon by the
court in reaching its decision was to examine carefully the Dis-
trict's proceedings as reflected in the trial record. If, as a result
of such scrutiny, it appears that the discharge was based upon
constitutionally protected behavior, the discharge cannot stand.
It must be clear to the court that the invalid reasons, although
discussed, played no part in the decision not to rehire. If the
invalid reasons played no part and the valid reasons are docu-
mented on the record, the decision will stand. 6 In Sweeny's case
the court clearly relied on the board members' testimony pertain-
ing to her radio appearance as showing that it was not a factor in
their decision. As the court saw it, the District's decision was
based entirely upon the "other (valid) reasons" that appeared on
the record. In Bertot's case the court apparently disregarded the
film incident, which might have provided a valid reason for non-
renewal. It is, therefore, reasonable to postulate that when an
invalid reason is given any weight, the decision will be over-
turned.'7
II. REMEDIES
Once a determination was made that the nonrenewal of Ber-
456 (4th Cir. 1973); Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972);
Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972); Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of
Educ., 440 F.2d 863 (8th Cir. 1971); Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970).
1 It is important to note that in neither Sweeny's nor Bertot's case did the court feel
it was presented with a situation where valid and invalid reasons were more or less equally
weighted in making the decision not to rehire. While finding in Sweeny's case that her
radio appearance played no part in the District's decision to terminate her employment,
the court concluded that, as to Bertot, the newspaper activities were the "paramount and
recurring" reasons for her nonrenewal. 522 F.2d at 1179, 1182.
,7 Appellants argued this position in their brief and cited cases standing for the
proposition that a dismissal is unconstitutional if motivated even partly by first amend-
ment activities. Brief for the Plaintiffs-Appellants at 15-16, id. at 1171. See Simard v.
Board of Educ., 473 F. 2d 988, 995 (2d Cir. 1973); Gieringer v. Center School Dist. 477
F.2d 1164, 1166 n.2 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 832 (1973); Langford v. City of
Texarkana, 478 F.2d 262, 268 (8th Cir. 1973); Cook County College Teachers Union v.
Byrd, 456 F.2d 882, 888 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972); Fluker v. Alabama
State Bd. of Educ., 441 F.2d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 1971). The typical language refers to actions
based in part upon protected activities. Presumably "in part" includes "small part" but
the issue has not been discussed directly.
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tot's contract was the result of constitutionally protected activity,
the Tenth Circuit faced the issue of remedies. Although Bertot
was clearly injured by the action of the District, the question who
should bear the burden of that injury remained. The fact that
public officials, discharging their duties, were responsible for that
injury raised some competing policy considerations: While on the
one hand it is unjust to deny compensation to an injured party,
it is seldom contested that the public interest is better served
when officials can perform their duties without fear of personal
liability.
The defendants in Bertot were sued in both their individual
and official capacities. The court declared that Bertot was enti-
tled to declaratory and injunctive relief. With respect to her claim
for money damages and backpay, the court found the defendants
in their individual capacities immune." The case was remanded
to determine whether the Board and the defendants, as officials,
could also claim immunity. The district court was also directed
to determine whether the District was a "person" subject to suit
under section 1983 and whether the eleventh amendment barred
a damage claim against the District and its officials. For a more
complete understanding of Bertot, it is necessary to discuss the
court's basis for finding the defendants individually immune and,
also, the main issues to be considered on remand.
A. Good Faith Immunity of Individual Defendants
The rationale for extending personal immunity to public
servants for harm they may cause in performing their functions
is, primarily, that the public benefits when its servants are able
to act without concern over possible liability. If officials are not
personally immune they will be deterred from acting when speed
is necessary or the law unsettled. They will be hindered in making
difficult decisions required in a complex society.
In the Tenth Circuit the doctrine of good faith immunity was
first applied to school officials in Smith v. Losee.19 The court
there declared that the defense of immunity was established by
a showing that the decision not to renew an employment contract:
1 522 F.2d at 1185.
It 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973). Smith sued the Utah State Board of Education and
various college officials, alleging deprivation of tenure and nonrenewal of his contract
because of activities protected by the first amendment.
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(1) Was a board action representing an exercise of the discretion
vested in it by state law, (2) was made in good faith, and (3) was
based on a valid reason evidenced in the record.20 The Tenth
Circuit, in Bertot, also relied on a recent Supreme Court case
which considered the status of a school board member's immun-
ity from damages in the context of a section 1983 action concern-
ing school discipline.
Wood v. Strickland" involved three girls who were expelled
for violating a school regulation against the use or possession of
intoxicating beverages at school activities. Two of the girls,
claiming a violation of section 1983 and their due process rights,
brought suit against the school board members, two administra-
tors, and the school district. They asked for compensatory and
punitive damages, and declaratory and injunctive relief. The
Court declared the test of immunity to be as follows:
[A] school board member is not immune from liability for damages
under § 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have known that the
action he took within the sphere of his official responsibility would
violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took
the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
constitutional rights or other injury to the student. . . . A compen-
satory award will be appropriate only if the school board member
has acted with such an impermissible motivation or with such disre-
gard of the student's clearly established constitutional rights that
his action cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good
faith."
,o Id. at 344.
21 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
11 Id. at 322 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court derived this test from three prior
cases dealing with the scope of official immunity. In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367
(1951), the Court found that since section 1983 was silent with respect to immunities, there
was no cause for thinking that Congress intended to eliminate a legislator's traditional
immunity from civil liability for acts done within the scope of his duties.
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), involved the immunities of a judge and arresting
officers in a section 1983 suit. The Court found that a judge's immunity from damages
for acts committed within his judicial discretion was firmly entrenched in the common
law. Since the legislative record gave no clear indication that section 1983 was intended
to abolish common law immunities, the judge was found to be immune and the officers
were afforded the common law defense of good faith and probable cause in section 1983
actions. In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), the Court stated that the eleventh
amendment barred suit where one was seeking money damages from the public treasury,
but that it was clear from the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), that the
amendment did not bar section 1983 suits against public officials who deprive others of
federal rights under the color of state law. Damages against individual defendants are
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The Court reasoned that if the school's decisionmakers were
held liable for damages every time an action is found to violate a
student's constitutional rights, it would unfairly impose upon
them liability for good faith mistakes made while exercising their
official discretion.
2 3
The Tenth Circuit was the first circuit to apply the immunity
test stated in Wood. The court found that the discretionary au-
thority the board members exercised over the employment con-
tracts in Bertot was analogous to the discretionary authority exer-
cised in Wood. Applying the Wood test, the court concluded that
the defendants, having acted in their official capacities, were
immune from damages individually.24 The record did not support
a finding of malice; furthermore, the jury had expressly found
that the defendants had acted in good faith in deciding not to
rehire the plaintiffs. In addition, the court found 25 that at the
time of the District's decision, the defendants could not have
known their action would violate Bertot's constitutional rights,
because the Tenth Circuit had earlier dismissed, for failure to
state a claim, a section 1983 suit that was brought on a very
similar set of facts.
26
Il. REMAND ISSUES
Bertot was remanded to the trial court for a determination
permissible in some circumstances notwithstanding the fact that they hold public office.
The Court described executive officers' immunity for official acts as being varied in scope,
depending upon the extent of their discretion, the responsibilities of the office, and all the
circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action.
It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and
in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords
a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for-acts performed in the
course of official conduct.
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974).
"Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1975). The Court reasoned that some
degree of immunity is necessary in order that the school officials will realize that actions
taken and decisions made in good faith in the performance of their duties will not be
punished. Even though the Court had stated that the Wood test was to be applied "in
the specific context of school discipline," id. at 322, 4 months after that decision the
Supreme Court remanded, for consideration in light of Wood, a case involving the liability
for damages of the superintendent of a state mental hospital. In O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563 (1975), the plaintiff was wrongfully kept against his will in a state hospital
without receiving treatment.
11 522 F.2d at 1185.
2s Id.
20 Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969).
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of the issues concerning plaintiff's damage claim against the Dis-
trict and the individual defendants as officials. The district court
was also directed to consider what effect potential immunities
would have on the claim." A brief discussion of the issues in-
volved may help to clarify the ultimate outcome of the case.
A. Eleventh Amendment
A basic question in an action such as this is whether it consti-
tutes a suit against the state. The eleventh amendment prohibits
federal courts from taking jurisdiction over suits brought against
a state by a citizen of the state."s However, that amendment does
not bar a suit when the plaintiff is seeking prospective equitable
relief, such as enjoining a public official to act in accordance with
federal law.29 Recently, the Supreme Court, in Edelman v.
Jordan,30 reaffirmed the basic eleventh amendment test: If state
funds must ultimately be used to pay an award, the suit is re-
garded as being a suit against the state, whether or not the state
is a named party, and the suit is therefore barred by the amend-
ment.
The eleventh amendment, however, does not bar suits
against counties or municipal corporations. In Edelman the Court
stated:
A county does not occupy the same position as a state for purposes
of the Eleventh Amendment. [There is a] long established rule that
while a county action is generally a state action for purposes of the
'7 The district court was directed to determine whether the good faith immunity could
apply to the District as a corporate entity and to the other defendants in their official
capacities, whether the eleventh amendment would bar a damage action against the
district and its officials, and whether the school district was a "person" suable under
section 1983. 522 F.2d at 1185.
The eleventh amendment states:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or in equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State.
The Supreme Court has often held that the amendment also bars suits against an uncon-
senting state by its own citizens. See Employees v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare,
411 U.S. 279 (1973); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); Great N. Life Ins. Co.
v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944); Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U.S. 311 (1920); Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. 1 (1890).
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
20 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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Fourteenth Amendment, a county defendant is not necessarily a
state defendant for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.3
In determining whether a suit is against the state or some
nonprotected corporation or political subdivision, the concept of
"alter ego" is often used.3" The term is used to denote two or more
entities, not separate and distinct, one of which is an
instrumentality of the other. In Harris v. Tooele County School
District,3 the Tenth Circuit ruled that the eleventh amendment
barred a tort claim against a Utah school district. The court
stated that whether a suit against a government subdivision is a
suit against the state depends on the pertinent state law. The
Utah Supreme Court had declared school districts to be agents
of the state. The court also applied the basic eleventh amend-
ment test of Edelman. The court concluded that the district was
not a separate and distinct entity from the state but was rather
its alter ego; therefore, the district was entitled to the state's
immunity from suit in a federal court.34 Court decisions are vir-
tually unanimous in ruling that, where a school board or school
district is sued and monetary damages rather than injunctive or
declaratory relief is requested, the suit will be barred by the elev-
enth amendment.
3 5
' Id. at 667 n.12. The leading case for the proposition that the eleventh amendment
does not bar suits against counties and municipal corporations is Lincoln County v.
Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890). That case was an action on county bonds and coupons.
Accord, Griffin v. School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). "It has long been established that
actions against a county can be maintained in United States courts in order to vindicate
federally guaranteed rights." Id. at 233.
32 E.g., George R. Whitten Jr., Inc. v. State Univ. Constr. Fund, 493 F.2d 177 (1st
Cir. 1974); Harris v. Tooele County School Dist., 471 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1973); Kansas
Turnpike Authority v. Abramson, 275 F.2d 711 (10th Cir. 1960).
471 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1973).
Accord, George R. Whitten Jr., Inc. v. State Univ. Constr. Fund, 493 F.2d 177 (1st
Cir. 1974), where state funds used to finance state university buildings (the construction
of which was seen as a state function) were dependent on state appropriations for support;
therefore, the fund was an alter ego of the state and protected from suit by the eleventh
amendment. See Kansas Turnpike Authority v. Abramson, 275 F.2d 711 (10th Cir. 1960).
There, the turnpike authority was found not to be an alter ego of the state because it was
a public corporation, not under state or agency supervision. "In sum, it is a public corpora-
tion-a creature of the legislature empowered to perform designated proprietary functions
without any obligation on the part of the State." Id. at 713.
See Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962); De Levay v. Richmond County
School Bd., 284 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1960); O'Neill v. Early, 208 F.2d 286 (4th Cir. 1953);
Gainer v. School Bd., 135 F. Supp. 559 (N.D. Ala. 1955). Contra, Fabrizio & Martin, Inc.
v. Board of Educ., 290 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The "where would the money come
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On remand, the threshold question regarding Bertot's dam-
age claim is whether it will be considered a suit against the State
of Wyoming. Accordingly, the court must look to the source of the
funds that would be used to satisfy an award. If the funds would
ultimately come from the state, i.e., if the district is found to be
an alter ego of the state, then Bertot's claim will be barred."
Wyoming law will govern whether Bertot can bring a damage
claim against the District and board members in their official
capacities. Unlike the Utah court in Harris, the Wyoming Su-
preme Court has not yet determined the relationship of school
boards to the state, and thus Wyoming statutes must be ana-
lyzed."
B. Section 1983 Immunity
The language of section 1983 refers to "persons" who act
under the color of state law to deprive others of federal rights. The
leading Supreme Court decision on section 1983 immunity is
Monroe v. Pape," which concerned a suit brought against certain
police officers and the City of Chicago. The Supreme Court ana-
lyzed in depth the history of section 1983 and concluded that
there was a cause of action against the individual police officers
but none against the city.
The response of the Congress to the proposal to make municipalities
liable for certain actions being brought within federal purview by
from" test was used to find that the school district was not an alter ego of the state but a
separate corporation. The state would not suffer from a judgment against the district.
m A suit against the individual board members in their official capacities would have
to be considered a suit against the district that employs them.
37 The Wyoming Education Code of 1969, Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 21.1-1 to -289 (Supp.
1970) states that school districts are corporate entities which can sue or be sued through
the board. Id. §§ -17, -27(a). Financial support for the school districts may be derived
from diverse sources: Funds may be obtained locally, from the county, from the state and
federal governments, and from various building funds, reserve funds, and bond issues. Id.
§§ -213 to -289. All school district funds are raised directly or indirectly through taxes. In
theory a damage award could be paid out of funds derived solely at the local or county
level, but, arguably, even this may ultimately reduce state funds. School districts operate
on fairly strict budgets; thus, if an award was to deplete the amount of money raised lo-
cally, then that amount would have to be made up from another source. One likely source
is the state treasury.
"' 365 U.S. 167 (1961). This is the famous case involving 13 Chicago police officers
who broke into Monroe's home without a warrant and forced him and his wife to stand
naked in the living room while they ransacked the house. They took Monroe downtown




the Act of April 20, 1871, was so antagonistic that we cannot believe
that the word "person" was used in this particular Act to include
them.
3
The word "municipalities" has been held to include the state and
all its subdivisions of government including municipal corpora-
tions." Furthermore, where a school district, school board, or
state university has been sued for damages under section 1983,
the courts have consistently held that the suit could not be main-
tained.4
It seems, then, that in order to bring a successful damage suit
under section 1983 against the District, Bertot will have to show
that Wyoming school districts are not part of the municipal gov-
ernment. However, the courts generally view the activities in-
cluded in the term "municipal government" very broadly; almost
any damage action which would result in an award paid out of
public funds is considered outside the scope of section 1983.
C. Immunities
The eleventh amendment and section 1983 aside, there is one
further barrier standing between Bertot and recovery. The final
question is whether the defendant school officials and the corpo-
rate District are protected by some sort of common law executive
" Id. at 191. Although the holding of Monroe had been confined to actions where only
damages were being sought and equitable or declaratory relief against municipalities had
been considered permissible in section 1983 actions, a recent Supreme Court decision has
declared that a city is protected from suit under section 1983 even when only equitable
relief is sought. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 512-13 (1973). There, the only
named defendants were cities; no individual officials were named either in their official
or individual capacities. Id. at 508.
41 For cases holding a state is not a person within section 1983, see Rothstein v.
Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972), Fear v. Pennsylvania, 413 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1969),
Williford v. California, 352 F.2d 474 (9th Cir. 1965). See also Sykes v. California, 497 F.2d
197 (9th Cir. 1974) (Department of Motor Vehicles not subject to suit under section 1983);
Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973) (hospital not within
section 1983); Barden v. University of Pittsburg, 497 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973) (university not
within section 1983); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973) (city
council not suable under section 1983); Ries v. Lynskey, 452 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1971) (city
not within section 1983).
1' E.g., Sterzing v. Fort Bend Indep. School Dist., 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974); Hunt-
ley v. North Carolina Bd. of Educ., 493 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1974); Williams v. Eaton, 443
F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1971); Buhr v. Buffalo School Dist., 364 F. Supp. 1225 (D.N.D. 1973);
Jones v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 1081 (E.D. Tenn. 1972); Webb v.
Lake Mills Community School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791 (N.D. Iowa 1972); Miller v. Parsons,
313 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
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immunity." The issue involved here is fairly narrow. Where ad-
ministrative officials, while performing their duties and exercis-
ing discretion, are found to have acted in good faith and without
malice, they are generally personally immune from damage
suits;4 3 the question remains as to whether this immunity also
applies to them in their official capacity and thus to the agency
that employs them. Practically, a suit against officials is a suit
against the employing agency that would have to pay the award.
Professor Davis argues against holding the public entity
immune wherever the employee is immune." He states that
when a person is harmed by official action it is unjust to make
the injured party bear the loss. The reason most often advanced
for an official's immunity is the public's interest in the fearless
administration of his task; possible personal liability would in-
hibit the official's actions. When only the agency's pocketbook is
involved, the official would not be deterred from fully exercising
his discretion. Since the public is the beneficiary of the agency's
actions, the public should bear the loss when the agency causes
injury. By making the agency liable, the loss is spread over the
general population rather than falling directly on one person.45
In a suit for damages by a school superintendent against a
school district, the California Supreme Court in Lipman v. Bris-
bane Elementary School District," said:
The immunity of the agency from liability for discretionary conduct
of its officials, however, is not coextensive with the immunity of the
officials in all instances .... It is unlikely that officials would be
as adversely affected in the performance of their duties by the fear
of liability on the part of their employing agency as by the fear of
personal liability. 7
42 The concept of executive immunity is based, in general, upon the idea that to allow
an unconsented suit against the government is inconsistent with its supreme executive
power. This immunity is extended to municipal corporations that perform a governmen-
tal, as opposed to a proprietary, function. The rationale for extending immunity to munic-
ipal corporations is that the particular function, which is a public benefit, could not be
carried out if money raised through taxes went instead to satisfy damage judgments. W.
PRossER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 131 (4th ed. 1971).
( Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
K. DAvIs, ADMINISrATIVE LAW TEATISE § 25.17, at 864-65 (Supp. 1970).
I5 d.
55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961).
' Id. at 229-30, 359 P.2d at 467, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 99. In Lipman, however, the court
found that the acts complained of were discretionary and that:
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In finding the district immune, the California court considered
the importance to the public of the function involved, the extent
to which governmental liability might impair free exercise of the
function, and the availability to individuals of remedies other
than tort suits for damages. 8
A test of this type may be crucial in the Bertot remand.
Public policy considerations may foreclose any remedy available
to Bertot for the damages she sustained. Public education is one
of the most important functions performed by government, and
the possibility of damage awards against the District could cer-
tainly deter officials from freely exercising discretion in the per-
formance of their function.
CONCLUSION
On remand the principal issues concerning Bertot's damage
claim against the school district and the individual defendants in
their official capacities will be whether the eleventh amendment
bars the suit, whether the District can be sued under section 1983,
and whether the District and its officials can claim immunity
from damages. If the school district is considered to be an instru-
mentality of the state, or if a damage judgment against it would
ultimately reduce state funds, then the damage claim will proba-
bly be barred by the eleventh amendment. If the District is found
to be a part of the municipal government, then it will not be a
"person" suable under section 1983 for damages. Finally, if the
court determines that the threat of damage judgments against
school districts would deter school district officers from exercising
discretion in the performance of their duties, it is likely that
common law executive immunity would bar the damage suit.
Ward L. Van Scoyk
There is a vital public interest in securing free and independent judgment
of school trustees in dealing with personnel problems, and trustees, being
responsible for the fiscal well-being of their districts, would be especially
sensitive to the financial consequences of suits for damages against the dis-
tricts.
Id.
SId.
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